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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VAGRANCY, LOITERING AND RELATED OFFENSES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH-Baker V. Binder, 274 F.Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
Beginning in the early spring of 1967 and continuing for several
months thereafter, the plaintiffs were engaged in a series of demonstrations in and about the city of Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiffs
were seeking to publicize alleged discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing in the community and to urge the passage of an
open housing ordinance by the Board of Aldermen.
Soon after these activities were commenced, a group known as
the "hecklers", who were dedicated to maintaining the status quo
in the sale and rental of housing, began assembling at the anticipated locations of demonstrations and taunting the open housing advocates. The police, fearing an actual confrontation between
these diverse groups, intervened and made a number of arrests, primarily from the plaintiffs' group. Further, as the demonstrations
and heckling continued, these law enforcement officials obtained a
restraining order designed to curtail the plaintiffs' activities. The
effect of the order was to allow demonstration activities only at
designated times and to require advance notice to the police of
the place of assembly. The order also limited the number of plaintiffs in each demonstration and required that the route of each
demonstration be specified. Subsequently, by stipulation, the restrictions of this order were somewhat relaxed.
The plaintiffs, individually and by class representation, brought
a suit which was double edged in nature: for declaratory judgment
relief as to the constitutionality of certain city ordinances, state
statutes and the circuit court's restraining order on one hand, and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of such laws against the
plaintiffs and their class, enforcement allegedly instituted by defendants with the specific purpose and resultant effect of curtailing plaintiffs' peaceful protest against the alleged racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing in Louisville.
The U.S. District Court by a two to one decision held that the
defendants were not "guilty of selective enforcement of the laws
against these plaintiffs so as to frighten or coerce them."' The
court went on to praise the performance of the police and stated
that "the enforcement activity in these circumstances does not
appear to us to have been dedicated to a halting of the demonstrations, but rather to a separation of the adversaries and to the pro1 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
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tection of all concerned, including the general public."'2 On this
point, the court concluded that:
Accordingly, we feel that the plaintiffs have failed by the proof
to support their allegation that the police, faced with the choice
between constitutional guarantees and actual control of the popuhus, they (the police) chose suppression of constitutional rights
rather than other avenues of control. We 3find no unconstitutional
use of an otherwise constitutional statute.
But having forecast what was to follow, the court proceeded
to issue its surprising decision-holding six statutes and ordinances
unconstitutional because they were vague and overbroad and of a
potentially sweeping application.
The following statutes of the State of Kentucky were declared
unconstitutional:
1) Criminal Syndicalism
Any person who commits, aids or counsels any crime, physical
violence, destruction of property, intimidation, terrorism or
other unlawful act or method to accomplish any political end
or to bring about political revolution shall be confined in the
penitentiary for not more than twenty-one years, or fined not
more than ten thousand dollars, or both.4
The court reasoned that this statute was too broad and was susceptible of sweeping application since it would be a criminal offense
to "counsel" an unlawful method to accomplish a political end. The
court relied on Keyishian v. Board of Regents5 in which the United
States Supreme Court struck down a state statute prohibiting
persons from "advising" about the doctrine of unlawful overthrow
of the government because "mere advocacy of abstract doctrine is
apparently included."6 Applying this rationale, the court held the
Kentucky Criminal Syndicalism statute unconstitutional.
2) Conspiracy; banding together for unlawful purpose
No two or more persons shall confederate or band themselves
together and go forth for the purpose of intimidating, alarming,
disturbing or injuring any person, or of taking any person
charged with a public offense from lawful custody with the
view of inflicting punishment on him or
of preventing his prose7
cution, or of doing any felonious act.

Id. at 660.
3 Id.
4 Ky.REv. STAT. § 432.020 (1962). See also NE. Rsv.
-17 (Reissue 1964).
2

STAT.

§ 28-815

5 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6 Id. at 600.
7 Ky. REa.
STAT. § 437.110 (1) (1962). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-301
and § 28-804 (Reissue 1964).
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The court found this statute too broad as it makes it a crime
for two or more persons to go forth together for the purpose of
"disturbing another." "It appears written as embracive of terms
of expression and is susceptible of being read to include such functions as peaceable assembly." s The court relied on a number of
Supreme Court cases which hold that one of the functions of freedom of speech is to invite dispute9 and that criminal penalties for
"disturbing" persons fail to provide a sufficient standard of responsibility. 0
3) Vagrancy
(1) Any person guilty of being a vagrant shall, for the first
offense, be fined ten dollars or imprisoned for thirty days, or
both. For the second and each subsequent offense, he shall be
imprisoned for sixty days.
(2) "Vagrant," as used in subsection (1) of this section and
KRS 436.530 means:
(a) Any able-bodied male person who habitually loiters or
rambles about without means to support himself, and who has
no occupation at which to earn an honest livelihood; or
(b) Any able-bodied male person without visible means of
support who habitually fails to engage in honest labor for his
own support or for the support of his family, if he has one; or
(c) Any idle and dissolute able-bodied male person who purposely deserts his wife or children, leaving any of them without suitable subsistence or suitable means of subsistence; or
(d) Any able-bodied person without visible means of support
who habitually refuses to work, and who habitually loiters on
the streets or public places of any city. 11
The court stated that this statute is a "catch all" not specific in
expression as to what it really seeks to prohibit nor what type of
conduct is violative of the prohibition. Perhaps, such was its aim and
12
intent; that it snare those felt to be vaguely undesirable."
The court held this statute to be unconstitutional because of
vagueness and overbreadth as movement is essential to freedom
and the rights of citizens cannot be dependent on one's property
status. The court concluded that:
It does not give fair notice; it is arbitrary as to its standards and
is grossly susceptible of over reaching federal constitutional guar274 F. Supp. at 661.
9 TerminieHo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
10 Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966). See also Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
11 KY. REV. STAT. § 436.520 (1962). See also NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 28-1115
-1119 (Reissue 1964).
12 274 F. Supp. at 662, citing Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948).
8
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antees by lending itself for ready 3 use by officials against those
deemed to merit their displeasure.'

The following ordinances of the City of Louisville were declared
unconstitutional:
1) Parading Without a Permit
It shall be unlawful for any person to conduct or to participate
in any street assemblage, parade or procession, other than a
funeral procession, upon any street except upon a permit issued
by the Director of Safety. Application for such permits shall
be made in such form as the Director of Safety shall prescribe
not less than 12 hours before the time intended for such assemblage, parade or procession. Such permit or an order accompanying it shall designate the places of gathering or formation and of dispersal of such assemblages, parades or processions, and the route of march or travel, and the streets or portions of streets which may be used or occupied therein, and
the time and duration of such assemblage, parade or procession;
provided, however, that no permits for parades or processions
of an advertising nature shall be granted at any time in the
Central Traffic District between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and
6:00 P.M.14

The court held that this ordinance was void as it failed to incorporate adequate standards to govern the discretion of the issuer
of the parade permits. Consequently, the ordinance was plainly
unconstitutional under Cox v. State of Louisiana.5
2) Disorderly Conduct
No person shall conduct himself in a disorderly manner in the
City.16

All parties to the suit were in agreement that the ordinance

provided no definition of the term "disorderly conduct." However,
the defendants contended that this defect was not crucial since "the
common man is familiar with the term and its application." 7 Fur-

thermore, the defendants contended that the vagueness of the
ordinance was cured by City of Pinevillev. Marshall18 which limited
disorderly conduct to "words and acts which tend to disturb the
peace or endanger the morals, safety
or health of the community,
19
or of a class of persons or family."'
18 Id. at 662. See also Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939) and Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
321.01. See also LINcOLN, NEE. CODE ch.
408 § 020 (1968) and OMAHA, NEB. CODE ch. 30.04 § 010, § 030 (1959).
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
LouisvmrL, Ky., ORDINANC E 507.02. See also NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 10;
LnTcoLw, NEB. CODE ch. 9:52 § 020 (1968); OmAHA, NEm. CODE ch.
13.08 § 040, ch. 29.04 § 140 (1959).
274 F.Supp. at 663.
222 Ky. 4, 299 S.W. 1072 (1927).
Id. at 9, 299 S.W. at 1074.

14 LouIsvLts, Ky. ORDINANCE

15

16
17
18

19
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However, the court held that the constitutional defect had not
been overcome as narrower disorderly conduct statutes had been
struck down by the Supreme Court.20 Consequently the ordinance
was struck down as "it leaves to the executive and judicial branches
too wide a discretion in the application of the law and too readily
permits them to make a crime out of what is protected activity."2' 1
3) Loitering and Related Offenses
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the following
acts:
(a) Loitering. Any person, without visible means of support,
or unable to give a satisfactory account of himself, found loitering or strolling in, about, or upon any street, alley, or other
public way or public place, or at any public gathering or assembly, or in or around any store, shop or business or commercial establishment ....gambling establishment, or establishment

where intoxicating liquor is sold without a license, or is conducting himself in 22a lewd, wanton or lascivious manner in
speech or behavior.
The court recognized that similar ordinances had been held to
be constitutional 2 but ruled that it could not stand as consistent
with recent expressions of the Supreme Court.2' Therefore, the
court declared the ordinance unconstitutional-again because "it
appears overbroad and vague. 2 5
The ordinance would punish any person who "loiters" in a
public place and is unable to give a satisfactory account of himself.
The court raised a number of pertinent questions which evidenced
the constitutional shortcomings of such an ordinance.
We do not believe that the requirement that an offender "give a
satisfactory account of himself" passes constitutional tests. It places
sole determination in the discretion of the policeman on the beat.
The standard of "satisfactory account" is not certain, for what may
be satisfactory to one may be unsatisfactory to another, and the
meaning of the word "satisfactory" itself is not susceptible of any
standard of exactness. What kind of "satisfactory"? Legal or moral
satisfaction? What is the time limit to be embraced within the
giving of "a satisfactory account" that will excuse the offender
in the sole discretion of the police officer who demands it? A satisfactory account at that instant or a satisfactory account of past
20

21
22

23
24
25

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp.
985 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
274 F. Supp. at 663.
LouisvLE, Ky. OP=NAxcE 525.01 (a). See also LiNcOLN, NEB. CODE
ch. 9.52 § 220 (1968) and OmAHA, NEB. CODE ch. 25.61 (1959).
See e.g., Hicks v. District of Columbia, 197 A.2d 154 (D.C. Ct. App.
1964).
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
274 F. Supp. at 664.
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activity? If of past activity, is that not guilt without proof? Does
the mere fact that one cannot give a satisfactory account of himself
to the pleasure of the inquiring officer make him guilty of an unspecified crime? Such unbridled discretion cannot
be constitu28
tionally vested in the policeman or the court.
District Judge Brooks dissented as he believed that Dombrowski
v. Pftster,27 which the majority had relied upon, did not compel
the abandonment of the doctrine of abstention. The majority read
Dombrowski as holding the abstention doctrine inappropriate when
"statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free
expression or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected
activities." 28 The majority thus concluded:
Any unconstitutional statute, attempting to regulate First Amendment rights, which has been invoked, or as here, in reasonable anticipation of future events will be invoked, against a member of
society, does, in and of itself, result in a suppression of constitutional rights, i.e.,
"chilling effect". 29
The dissent, however, asserted that this case was distinguishable
from Dombrowski. Since "[t]he plaintiffs' proof has completely
failed to establish any of the factual allegations of their complaint
and amended complaint upon which they relied for invoking the
jurisdiction of this court,"30 the fact that the ordinances and statutes
in question may be subject to constitutional challenge "should not
of itself permit federal interference with a state's good-faith admin8' 1
istration of its criminal laws.
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove that irreparable injury, based on a substantial loss of federal rights, would occur if they were to await the state court's
disposition and ultimate review by the Supreme Court. The dissent stated that "the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act, KRS
Chapter 418, provides expeditious procedure by which the constitutionality of the challenged statutes and ordinances can be determined without invoking federal jurisdiction."3 2 The dissent concluded that the Supreme Court had consistently followed the doc-

26

Id.

27 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
28

Id. at 489-90.

29

274 F. Supp. at 660.

30 Id. at 665.

31 Id.
32 274 F.
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
tucky,

Supp. at 665-66. See Cassidy v. City of Bowling Green, 368
318 (Ky. 1963); Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 215
557 (1948); City of Harrodsburg v. Southern Ry. Co. in Ken278 Ky. 10, 128 S.W.2d 233 (1939).
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trine of abstention in attacks upon state laws 33 and urged that
this doctrine should have been followed here.
Thus by a two to one decision a heavy blow was struck against
Kentucky's vagrancy laws. The way the tide of the law is flowing,
similar laws in other states may well be in jeopardy as Baker v.
Binder may well reflect the current revolution in legal services for
the poor as well as the continuing evolution of social and legal
values. The voiding of vagrancy and similar statutes may well
become common in all the courts of the land.
Loitering and disorderly conduct statutes have long been criticized as being catch-alls whereby the sensibilities of certain citizens may be protected from certain activities which they consider
offensive. 84 And vagrancy statutes have been attacked for making
no activity a crime. However, the roots of these laws run deep and
their history may be traced back to feudal times when they were
utilized by the lords to "protect" themselves from undesirables.
Vagrancy statutes then developed as the criminal side of the poor
laws.35 Apparently the philosophy behind such modern day statutes
is that a vagrant is a probable criminal; that there is some correlation between vagrancy and criminal conduct.
Fortunately, in recent years such statutes have, with increasing
frequency, been coming under the watchful eye of the courts.86
Such statutes have occasionally been struck down for their vagueness. President Roosevelt vetoed one such statute which made a
vagrant out of "any person leading an idle life... and not giving
a good account of himself."37 The President stated that "while this
phraseology may be suitable for general purposes as a definition
of a vagrant, it does not conform with accepted standards of legislative practice as a definition of a criminal offense.138 President
Roosevelt pointed out that the statute was so broadly drawn that
"in many cases it would make a vagrant of an adult daughter or
son of a well-to-do family who, though amply provided for and
33

34

Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360
U.S. 219 (1959); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950); Spector
Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Douglas v. City of

Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies,
Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
On the other hand, American music and literature has even immortalized the vagabond. Consider the success of Mr. Roger Miller's 1965
"hit" song King of the Road.

35

3

36
37

Johnson v. Florida, 88 S. Ct. 1713 (1968).
See S. REP. No. 821, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1941).

38 Id.

STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN

ENGLAND
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(1883).
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not guilty of any improper or unlawful conduct, has no occupation
and is dependent upon parental support."3 9
Crimes of status have long been found to be offensive and yet
these vagrancy laws have been retained in communities across
the nation. Such statutes cannot help but increase the poor's disrespect for law as these statutes reinforce the view that the "system" discriminates against the poor. And if the state really wishes
to discourage idleness, a more realistic approach would be for Congress and the state legislatures to enact the job programs which
are now being so adamantly sought by the nation's poor. Furthermore, if such statutes exist only to clear the streets so as to protect
the sensitivities of society's "good citizens," why do we insist on
jails? Why not provide living quarters, food and medical attention?
But there is an even greater fear than that created by the simple
irrationality of these statutes. If the state is allowed to classify
mere offensive presence as being criminal or to punish one for
being poor, then the state could build on that unbridled power
and classify any conduct or status as criminal. Events in this poli-

tical year have shown that actual repression is a real threat.
Perhaps the problem could be lessened by more careful drafting
of such statutes to prevent overbreadth, vagueness and potential
room for illegal applications of the police power. But any statutes
of this nature which restrict a person's freedom of choice and freedom of movement should only be acceptable if the state can articulate a valid societal interest which demands protection. The burden
should clearly be on the state to offer such evidence and none so
far has been shown to exist. The state should be required to offer
evidence of some relationship between vagrancy, loitering, disorderly conduct and "actual" criminal conduct. One author has
seriously challenged the mere assumption which now exists that
there is some clear correlation. 40 If the state cannot carry this
burden and show some relationship between vagrancy and criminal
conduct, then the state has no interest which merits protection by
such statutes.
Robinson v. California4 held that it is unconstitutional to define
an involuntary status as criminal. This decision should be made
applicable to vagrancy laws. However, despite the growing awareness of the existence and plight of our nation's poor, it would be
difficult in individual cases to prove that one's status was involun39 Id.
40 Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV.

603,627 (1956).
41 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

292

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 1 (1968)

tary. Consequently, the rule of Robinson should be broadened to
prohibit the existence of criminal statutes based solely on economic
status even if such status is voluntary.
Justice William 0. Douglas brought the issue close to home
when he wrote in 1960:
Vagrancy and arrest on suspicion are not distant, remote, speculative; they are just around the corner in many of our communities.
It is what takes place in this block and in this neighborhood that
gives the true reading on the health of our democratic way of life
and on the actual vigor of our Bill of Rights.42
Efforts should be made to reexamine these catch-all statutes to
determine whether they protect a valid interest of our society or
merely restrict our freedoms. If a valid state interest can be
offered, then such statutes would be justified, although it is obvious
that they would still need serious revamping. New statutes should
then be drawn which direct attention to specifics: specific state
interests and specific activities to be restricted. If no legitimate
interest exists, then Baker v. Binder may fairly indicate that it is
simply time to void such laws and concentrate on eliminating poverty instead of simply legislating against it.
H. Bruce Hamilton '69
42

Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L. J. 1, 14 (1960).

